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274 ANDERSOX v. MART [47 C.2d 
19535. In Bank. Nov. 
DOROTHY A. ANDEHSO:N, 
MART, as Adminisi 
Divorce-Permanent .<>.lJ.muu.y~-x:.u"~;~ of Agreement of Parties. 
for of the wife 
and a minor settle-
entered into the agreement the 
inconvenience and litigation 
their rights and 
from all claims and demands 
should have the care, custody 
and to the premise of 
law could control such only to the extent 
that their agreement coincided with the order which any 
court of competent jurisdiction might make for the best in-
terest of the child, and that the agreement 
was to be a full and final settlement of the property rights 
of the parties and of all claims which either might have 
against the other. 
[2] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Duration of Allowance-Termina-
tion.-Where provisions of a property settlement agreement 
between husband and wife establish that a provision for 
monthly payments for support and maintenance of the wife 
and a minor child was an inseparable part of the agreement 
and not a provision for alimony, and where at the time such 
agreement was executed such payments did not terminate on 
the husband's death or the wife's remarriage unless the agree-
ment so provided, failure so to provide clearly indicates that 
the payments should not so terminate and fortifies the con-
clusion that a separable for alimony was not in-
tended. 
[3] !d.-Permanent of Agreement of Parties.-
A provision in a property settlement agreement between 
husband and wife that monthly payments for support of the 
wife and a minor child were to be subject to court approval does 
not establish that they were and the fact that the 
parties could not by their 
agreement control the court's power to make orders for the 
support of their child does not conflict with their expressed 
See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 217; Am.Jur., 
Divorce and Separation, § 586 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: 3] Divorce, § 203; Divorce, § 214; 
[4] Divorce, § 215; Judgments, § 115 Divorce, § 204; [7] 
Divorce, § 239; [8] § 295. 
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intention that should 
be final and conclusive. 
!d.-Permanent Alimony"-Duration of Allowance-Termina-
tion.-Provisions of a •wnn.cwtu 
husband and wife that 
claim 
ance, " and 
hereafter contract any 
rmnn.u><tu or estate of the 
not assumed or otherwise 
and do not the enforcement of contractual 
obligations for support and maintenance of the wife given in the 
agreement in consideration of of one spouse in the prop-
erty or estate of the other out of the marital rela-
tionship, and hence do not preclude application of the rule 
that payments agreed to as an inseparable part of the property 
settlement do not terminate on the husband's death. 
Judgments-Relief Granted.-The purpose of Code 
Civ. Proc., § 580, declaring that relief granted to plaintiff, 
if there be no answer, cannot exceed that which he shall have 
demanded in his complaint, is to insure adequate notice to 
defendant of the demands made on him. 
Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Pleading.-Whcre plaintiff, in 
her complaint for divorce, alleged that there was no community 
property, "a property settlPment agreement having been 
entered into between the parties," where defendant, who ad-
mitted this allegation, was aware of the terms of the agree-
ment and knew that it provided for a designated monthly 
payment for support of plaintiff and a child subject to court 
approval, and where the complaint contained no allegation 
attacking the validity of the agreement and plaintiff prayed for 
an order for payment of precisely the sums agreed to therein, 
defendant had adequate notice that the award sought was that 
provided for in the agreement, and the reasonable interpreta-
tion of such complaint was that plaintiff was not abandoning 
the contract but was seeking the support provided therein. 
!d.-Enforcement of Awards.-Where a divorced wife, in her 
action against the administratrix of the former husband's 
estate to enforce her claim to support money, did not secure, 
and under the divorce decree could not secure, anything to 
which she was not entitled under a property settlement agree-
ment, defendant could raise no valid objection to its enforce-
ment as a contract obligation. 
[47 C.2d 
of Children~Orders Subsequent to Decree.~ 
for support of the 
the amount of 
the child's hut 
nttTibntable to the rhild'~ 
and when tlw decref; 
allocation the trial eourt mny 




cannot he reduced during 
to pay the amount 
terminatt>s on his reaching 
is silent on the question of 
detPnnine the allocation in 
Court of Contra 
;Judge. Heversed with 
Action by a divorced wife administratrix of former 
husband's estate to enforce her claim to support money. 
Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions. 
Johnson & Harmon and Robert II. Johnson for Appellant. 
Pasquinelli, O'Connor & Panelli and Timothy A. O'Connor 
for Respondent. 
'l'RA YNOR, J.-On March 12, 1948, plaintiff Dorothy A. 
Anderson and decedent ·william E. Anderson executed a prop-
erty settlement agreement. On June 22, 1948, plaintiff filed 
an action against decedent for divorce. In her complaint she 
alleged jurisdictional extreme cruelty, her fitness for 
child custody, and that she ''does not have sufficient money, 
means or property with which to support and maintain her-
self and the minor child of the parties hereto, and that the 
sum of $60.00 per month is a reasonable and necessary sum 
to be allowed said plaintiff as and for the support and main-
tenance of said plaintiff and the minor child of the parties 
hereto.'' She alleged that ''there is no community property 
. . . , a property settlement having been entered into by and 
between the parties." She prayed for a dissolution of the 
marriage, for custody of the child, and that "the defendant 
be required to pay to plaintiff the sum of $60 per month as 
and for the support and maintenance of said plaintiff and the 
minor child'' and ''for such other and further relief as the 
court deems meet and proper." 'l'here was no request that 
the court approve the agreement or incorporate it in its 
decree. 
The decedent filed an answer in propria persona admitting 
Nov.l956] ANDERSON V. 1\fART 
[47 C.2d 274; 303 P.2d 539] 
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all the allegation of extreme and 
the allegations with respect to support. He made no further 
appearance in the action, and it was tried as a default action. 
On July 26, 1948, an interlocutory decree was entered grant-
the divorce, awarding of the child to plaintiff, and 
decedent to ''pay to plaintiff the sum of $60.00 per 
month as and for the and maintenance of said plain-
tiff and the minor child. . .. " It also decreed that the prop-
settlement agreement 'be, and the same is hereby ap-
and and the terms thereof are incorporated 
herein with the same force and effect as if set forth in full 
herein." Decedent did not appeal, and on October 11, 1949, a 
final decree of divorce was entered, incorporating the terms of 
the interlocutory decree. Decedent remarried, and his widow, 
Mandie 0. Mart, who remarried after his death, is the ad-
ministratrix herein. 
On September 24, 1951, plaintiff and her attorney signed 
and delivered to decedent a stipulation entitled in the court 
and cause and providing that the interlocutory and final de-
crees ''may be modified so as to provide that the defendant 
pay to plaintiff the sum of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) a month 
as and for the support and maintenance of plaintiff and the 
minor child of the parties hereto, and that the above-entitled 
court may cause to be made and entered herein its order so 
modifying said decrees.'' The stipulation was not filed, and 
the decrees were not modified, but thereafter decedent paid 
plaintiff only $50 per month. On April 5, 1952, decedent died. 
Plaintiff presented to the administratrix of his estate a claim 
for $60 per month for her life expectancy. The claim was 
rejected, and plaintiff brought this action. 
The trial court found that the estate was indebted to 
plaintiff on the property settlement agreement and that the 
agreement was incorporated in and made a part of the decree 
in the divorce action and that the provision for support therein 
was an inseparable part of an integrated property settlement 
agreement and therefore entered judgment for plaintiff for 
$14,190 to be paid out of the funds of the estate in due course 
of administration. That sum was fixed by the court as the pres-
ent value of $50 per month for plaintiff's life expectancy. De-
fendant administratrix appeals. 
In their agreement plaintiff and decedent provided: 
"WHEREAS, there is one (1) child the issue of said marriage 
of the parties hereto . . . ; and, 
278 
in consideration of 
hereinafter set 
hereto do 
"FIRsT: That . 
AXDEHSON v. MART [47 0.2d 
hereto desire to avoid expense, 
with respect to the settle-
and obligations 
in consideration of the premises, and 
the mutual promises and undertakings 
to be legally bound, the 
as follows: 
released and ab-
solved from any and all demands of the other, 
including all claims of either party upon the other party for 
support and maintenm1ee as hnsband and wife, or otherwise, 
it being understood that this instrument is intended to settle 
the rights of the hereto in all respects, except as here-
inafter provided .... 
''SECOND : That any and all property acquired by either 
party from and after the date hereof shall be the sole and 
separate property of the party acquiring the same; and each 
party does hereby grant to the other party all sueh future 
acquisitions of property as the sole and separate property 
of the party acquiring the same. 
"'l'HIRD: 'l'hat each party shall have the immediate right to 
dispose of or bequeath ·will his or her interests in and to 
any and all property belonging to him or her from and after 
the date hereof, and said right shall extend to all of the afore-
said future of as well as to all property 
set over to either party under this agreement. 
'' FoUR'rrr: That eaeh does hereby waive and quitclaim 
any right to share in the estate of the other party, either 
under a \Vill or by the laws of or by family allow-
ance, or otherwise. 
"Pn"rH: That each does hereby accept the provisions 
herein mane for him or for her in full satisfaction of his 
or her right to the community property of the parties, or 
other property acquired after marriage by either party, and 
in full satisfaction of his or her right, if any, to alimony or 
support ana maintcnanee. Neither party shall at any time 
hereafter contraet any or liability against the 
property or estate of the other party, and, in the event either 
party shaH do so, he or she will save the other party harmless 
and free from loss occasioned by sueh act.' 
Provisions were then made for the division of the property. 
Bank rleposits amounting to $5,726.87 and United States 
'War Savings bonds having an approximate maturity value 
of $2,500 were diviilerl equally rlecerlent received the better 
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: "H is understood and recognized 
hereto that can control the of the 
minor child of the hereto the extent that their 
coincides >Yith the order which any Court of com-
may make for best interest of said 
to such of the parties 
hereto agree that the "Wife shall have the care, and 
control of the minor child, with reasonable right of visitation 
vested in Husband." 
Paragraph 16 provided: "Subject to approval by any Court 
of competent jurisdiction, Husband agrees to pay to Wife 
the sum of Sixty ($60.00) Dollars per month as and for the 
support and maintenance of Wife and the minor child of the 
hereto, commencing forthwith and continuing in a 
like sum each and every month thereafter_" 
Paragraph 18 provided in part: " ... this agreement is 
intended to be, and is, a full, final and eomplete settlement 
of the property rights of the parties hereto and of all elaims 
which either party has or might claim to have had against the 
other, were it not for this agreement. . . . '' 
Paragraph 19 provided: ''This agreement can be modified, 
cancelled, or rescinded only by a written agreement for that 
purpose, executed by the parties hereto .... " 
[1] In Messenger v. JJtessengM", 46 Cal.2d 619, 628 [297 
P.2d 988], we held that when "the parties have clearly ex-
pressed their 'purpose of fixing and adjusting their personal 
and property rights,' have provided that the provision for 
alimony is 'for and in consideration of the permanent and 
lasting division and settlement of all their property rights of 
every kind and nature,' and the wife has waived 'all right to 
future maintenance and support ... , except as herein other-
wise expressly provided,' the conclusion is inescapable that 
they have made the provisions for support and maintenance 
an integral and inseparable part of their property settlement 
agreement. With such conclusive evidence of integration, 
the provisions for support and maintenance or alimony would 
be subject to modification only if the parties expressly so 
provided." It is abundantly clear from the second whereas 
clause, the now therefore clause, and the first, fifth, and 
C.2d 
within the 
however, that the 
agreement to for the termination of the payments 
on the death of decedent or of plaintiff and the 
provision that the payments were to be subject to the approval 
of the the conelusion that the provision for 
monthly was for Accordingly, she con-
cludes that it could be modified the court and that the 
obligation it terminated on decedent's death. If it 
from other that separable alimony pay-
ments were intended, the omission of termination dates could 
be explained, as defendant on the theory that the 
payments would terminate on the death of decedent (see 
Miller v. Snperio1· Omwt, 9 Cal.2d 733, 737 [72 P.2d 868] ; 
Roberts v. Higgins, 122 Cal.App. 170, 171 [9 P.2d 517]) or 
remarriage of plaintiff. Civ. Code, § 139.) The other 
provisions of the agreement established, however, that the pro-
vision for monthly payments was an inseparable part of the 
property settlement and not a provision for alimony, and 
at the time the agreement was executed* such payments did 
not terminate on the death of the husband or the remarriage 
of the wife unless the agreement so provided. (Parker v. 
Parker, 193 Cal. 478, 480-481 [225 P. 447] ; Lane v. Bradley, 
124 Cal.App.2cl 661, 665 [268 P.2cl 1092] ; Anthony v. 
Anthony, 94 Cal.App.2cl 507, 511 [211 P.2d 3311 ; Hamilton 
v. Hamilton, 94 Ca1.App.2d 293, 300 [210 P.2cl 750] ; Estate 
of Mesmer, 94 Cal.App. 103 [270 P. 732] ; see Miller v. 
Superior Oonrt, supra, 9 Cal.2d 733, 737; Pearman v. Pear-
man, 104 Cal.App.2d 250, 255 [231 P.2cl 101] ; Gosnell v. 
Webb, 66 Cal.App.2d 518, 521 [152 P.2d 463].) Under these 
circumstances the failure so to provide clearly indicates that 
the payments should not so terminate and fortifies the con-
clusion that a separable provision for alimony was not in-
tended. 
[3] The contention that the provision that the payments 
were to be subject to the approval of the court establishes that 
*In 1951 section 139 was amended to provide in part that "Except 
as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, the obligation of any party 
in any decree, judgment or order for the support and maintenance of 
the other party shall terminate upon the death of the obligor or upon 
the remarriage of the other party." Since the agreement in this case 
was executed, and the decree entered, in 1948, the effect of the 1951 
amendment on the interpretation of similar agreements and decrees made 
after its enactment is not before us. 
Nov. 1B:J6l ANDERSON v. MART 
[47 C2d 274; 303 P.2d 5391 
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their 
control the court power make orders for the 
support of their child in no way conflicts with their 
intention that as between themselves their agree-
ment should be flnal and eonclusiYe. Puckett 
21 Ca1.2d 842-843 r .2d 1] . ) That this was 
their understanding is further indic;ated the fact that 
when a modification was desired decedent to 
plaintiff, it was negotiated pnrsnaut to 19, 
which provided that the agreement coulcl be modified " 
a written agreement for that purpose." 
[4] It is contended that tlw 111 the fourth para-
graph that "each part;- does wain~ am1 q11itelaim ally 
right to share in the estate of the other , Pither under 
a \Yill or by the la1v-s of snceession. or b,v allowarJc:e, 
or otherwise," and the provision of the fifth paragraph that 
"Neither party shall at any time l1 coutract any debt, 
eharge, or liabilit,\T against the property or estate of the other 
party, and, in the eyent either party shall do so, he or she 
will save the other par·ty harmless and free from loss occasioned 
by such act" establish that the pa:vments >Yere to terminate on 
decedent's death. (Emphasis added.) It is obvions that the 
quoted provision of the fifth paragraph is irrelcYant in tlti,;; 
respect since it refers to any debt, charge>, or liability to be 
contracted hereaftrr and not to the obligations a"snmrd in the 
agreement itself. It is an obligation assunwd in the agree-
ment itself that plaintiff is now to enforcr. It is 
also obvious that the fonrt11 paragranh refers only to an_\T 
rights to share in tl1e estate not otherwise providr•d for in 
the agreement. It is similar in its broac1 language to the 
proYisions of the second and third paragraphs in which each 
of the parties waived all rights in any of thr assigned 
to the other and any property to be thereafter arqnired by 
the other. 'l'aken together these proyisious makf: elear that 
neither party should have any rig:llts in the property or the 
estate of the other growing nut of tlw marital relationship. 
The agrerment was ~'Xrr·u1(•(1 io sf'itl<> and of ihose 
rights in cxehangn fol' thosf' provide<l in tho all('! 
of a 
husband. 
Defendant contends that the 
did not the settlement in issue and 
that since plaintiff did not pray for any relief with 
to , the court had no power to approve the prop0rty 
settlement and it into its rlrcrPe. (See 
Burtnett v. King, 33 Ca1.2d 805 [205 P.2d 657, 12 A.L.R.2d 
333] .) 
Code of Civil Procedure, section 580, provides: "The relief 
granted to the plaintiff, if thrre be no answer, cannot exceed 
that which he shall have demanded in his complaint; but 
in any other case, the court may grant him any relief con-
sistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced 
within the issue." If under the pleadings, the allegation of 
plaintiff's need for an award of $60 per month for the child's 
and her support and her prayer therefor may reasonably 
be interpreted as made pursuant to the of the prop-
erty settlement agreement, tl1e court, in basing its award on 
the agreement of the parties, did not grant relief in excess of 
that demanded in the complaint or inconsistent with the case 
made by the complaint and embraced within the issue. 
[5] The purpose of section 580 is to insure ade-
quate notice to the defendant of the demands made upon him. 
(Bnrtnett v. King, supra, 33 Cal.2d 811; Pac1>jic JY!ut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. McConnell, 44 Cal.2d 715, 727 P.2d 636].) 
[6] In the present case it is clear that decedent was given 
adequate notice that the award ·was that provided 
for in the agreement. In her complaint plaintiff alleged that 
there was no community ''a property settlement 
agreement having been entPred into by and between the 
parties." Decedent admitted this allegation, and he was 
aware of the terms of the agreement. He knew that it pro-
vided for the payment of $60 per month for the support of 
plaintiff and the child subject to the of the court. 
was liable under the terms it::;elf even if the 
of the was not into the 
divorce decree. At the trial plaintiff sought and secured a 
decree to her agreement. She 
has never nceeived than the agreement pro-
ami she hac; never attempted to seeure the benefits 
of an alimony award by seeking an increase in the amount 
of the Had she attempted to seeure the benefits 
of an alimony decree attacking the jurisdiction of the 
court to make the sllpport award pursuant to the agreement, 
she would have been to attack the decree she pro-
enred. (WhiUow 87 Cal.App.2d 175, 
185 [196 P.2d 8(} Cal.App.2d 456, 470 
P.2d 842] ; , 18 Cal.App.2d 481, 
483-484 [ G4 P.2d ; see 1 Witkin, California Procedure, 
412-413.) Since plaintiff did not secnre, aucl undrr the divorce 
decree could not secure, anything to which she ·was not entitled 
under her agreement, defendant could raise no valid objection 
to its enforcement as a eontraet obligation. 
'l'he trial court fixed the amount of the ;judgment as the 
value of $50 per month for plaintiff's life expectancy 
of approximately 24 years. The payments were ordered, how-
eyer, for the snpport of both plaintiff and the minor child. 
[8] Although the amount of the payments cannot be rc>dueed 
the minority of the child v. Puckett, supm, 
21 Cal.2cl 843), the obligation to pay the amount thereof 
attributable to the child's support terminate's on his reaching 
his and when the decree is silent on the question of 
allocation, the trial court may determine the allocation in 
subsequent proceedings. (Hopkins v. Hopkins, 46 Cal.2d 313, 
315-316 (294 P.2d 1] ; Meek v. Meek, 51 Cal.App.2d 492, 495, 
amount attributable 
in accord with this 
C. and concurred. 
CAUTER, Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in the 
result reached by the majority insofar as it holds that the 
minor child should not receive support from the estate of its 
deceased father except until it reaches its majority and that 
the trial court should be directed to determine the amount 
to be allocated to it out of the total support payments until 
that time. I dissent from that part of the majority opinion 
which holds that plaintiff, the first wife of the decedent, is 
entitled to receive any part of the support provided for from 
the estate' of the decedent. 
I am of the opinion that Paragraph SIXTEENTH of the agree-
ment is, and was intended by the parties, to be severable from 
the balance of the agreement. Paragraph SIXTEENTH provides 
that'' Subject to the approval by any Court of competent juris-
diction, Husband agrees to pay to \Vife the sum of Sixty 
($60.00) Dollars per month as and for the support and mainte-
nance of ·wife and the minor child of the parties hereto, 
commencing forthwith and continuing in a like sum each and 
every month thereafter." The property settlement division 
was set forth in preceding paragraphs and provided for an 
almost equal division of the community property of the parties. 
'fhe provision for $60.00 per month was obviously not con-
sidered by the parties as equalizing the division of the property 
and it was made expressly subject to court approval, which 
the property division had not been. It seems very obvious 
that this case does not fall within the rule of the Messenger 
case (Messenger· v. Messenger, 46 Cal.2d 619, 628 [297 P.2d 
988]) where a majority of this court held that the alimony 
provision >vas clearly for and in consideration of the perma-
nent and lasting division and settlement of all their property 
rights of every kind and nature. No such provision is found 
in the case at bar. 
Nov.1956] ANDERSON v. ]\./[ART 
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In ~wcuvc.u.L complaint for divorce she made the 
"That there is 
of the 
ment having been entered 
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the and '' 'l'hat plaintiff does not have sufficient 
money, means or ·with which to 
herself and the minor child of the 
sum of $60.00 per month is a reasonable and necessary sum 
io be allowed to said plaintiff as and for the and 
maintenance of said and said minor child of the 
parties hereto." In its interlocutory decree of the 
trial court, in four separate paragraphs ordered that plain-
tiff be granted a divorce; (2) that plaintiff have the custody 
and control of the minor child; on that defendant pay to 
plaintiff "the sum of $60.00 per month as ancl for the ·''"""·nrN·t. 
and maintenance of said plainNff ancl the minm· child of the 
parties hereto, said payments commencing forthwith and 
continuing in a like sum on the 23rd of each and every 
month thereafter" (emphasis added) ; that "l'r Is FuR-
THER ORDERED, AnaUDGED AND DECREED that the Proprrty 
Settlement Agreement made and entered into between the 
parties hereto on the 12th day of March, 1948, be, and the 
same is hereby approved and ratified, and the terms thereof 
are incorporated herein with the same force and effect as if 
set forth in full herein." It therefore clearly appears that 
both the plaintiff and the court considered that the provision 
for monthly payments was a separate and distinct thing from 
the property settlement. The original complaint did not 
pray for court approval of the property settlement agreement 
and the court specifically so found in the case at bar. The 
complaint set forth, merely, that there was no community 
property because it had been theretofore divided between the 
parties and prayed for, on the ground of the sum of 
$60 per month as support for plaintiff and the minor child. 
Paragraph FoURTH reads as follows : ''That each does 
hereby waive and quitclaim any right to share in the ('state 
of the other party, either tmder a Win or by the laws of 
succession, or by family allowance, or otherwise." (Emphasis 
added.) Paragraph FIFTH reads as follows: '' 'fhat each 
party does hereby accept the provisions herein made for him 
or for her in full satisfaction of his or her to the 
community property of the parties, or other property acquired 
after marriage by either party, and in full satisfaction of his 
or her right, if any, to alimony or support and maintenance. 
286 ANDERSON v. :MART 
"""''n.r.,,. contract any 
n>"fl'Yl.~>"'tqJ or esf(tte the other 
shall do so, he or she 
loss occa-
maintenance of the 
was set forth in full m 
divorce thus indicating that the as well as the parties, 
intended the provision as separate and apart from 
the property settlement provisions of the agreement. This 
provision was therefore merged in the (Hough v. 
Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605 [160 P.2d 15]). Each party did, by 
the terms of the agreement, specifically waive any and all right 
to share in the estate of the which provision is ines-
capable proof that the support payments were not to continue 
after the death of the one obligated therefor. In the majority 
opinion it is said that "It is also obvious that the fourth 
paragraph refers only to any to share in the eBtate 
not otherwise provided " (Emphasis 
added.) In so holding the is writing something into 
both the agreement and decree to the intentions of 
the parties and the court. The court treated the support 
provision as something and apart from the 
agreement. The property of parties was evenly divided 
and plaintiff in her complaint alleged that "there is no com-
munity property" and prayed for support for herself and 
the child on the ground of need. It would appear that had 
she considered the as part of the 
community property settlement agreement her complaint 
would have been differently worded. In Parlcer v. Parker, 
193 Cal. 478, 481 [225 P. 447], it was held that provision for 
permanent alimony is founded upon the obligation which 
the law imposes upon the husband to support the and 
"that obligation comes to an end upon the death of either 
spouse. So, regardless of the language used by a court in 
making a provision in its decree for the payment of alimony, 
that provision ceases to be effective upon the death of either 
spouse. But here v;e have a provision [based upon an agree-
ment to pay the support during the lifetime of the wife] 
based upon an of the parties, in effect a contract. 
the sum and substance of the 
122 170 [9 P.2d 
avYarded and rnaintenance to the and the appel-
court held that alimony terminated on the death of either 
party. 'l'he conclusion appears inescapable that the provision 
for support insofar as it relates to the plaintiff terminated 
upon the death of her former husband and that she has no 
claim against his estate for her support after his death. 
So far as the minor child of the is concerned a 
different problem is presented. 'vve held in 1'aylor v. George, 
34 Cal.2d 552 [ 212 P .2d 505 J, that "In California the rule 
is that the obligation of a father to support his minor child 
which is fixed by divorce decree or property settlement agree-
does not cease upon the father's death, but survives as 
his eRtate. v. Burwell, 216 Cal. 608 
P.2d ; Estate 200 Cal. 654 [254 P. 567]; 
Estate of Caldwell, 129 Oal.App. 613 [19 P.2d 9].)" In the 
i'-Jewman case supra, the decree had provided that the father 
P<1Y a certain sum monthly to plaintiff for the support of the 
minor child of the parties "until further order of court." 
This court held that such an obligation continued after the 
death of the father and during the minority of the child. "And 
rightfully so, for it is the solemn duty of every father to 
snpport his children during their minority, and if he fails 
t do so, every principle of justice demands that be thus 
out of his estate." (Pp. 612·613.) 
In view of the conclusion reached by me that the monthly 
provision of the and decree was intended 
the court and the to be severable from the provi-
to property division in the agreement and not 
an part I would reverse the judgment 
with directions to the trial court to determine what portion 
of the monthly payment should be allocated for the support 
:!88 
and her claim 
disallowed. 
It follows from vvhat I have heretofore said 
entitled to no of the decedent's estate 
his estate for her support should be 
was, or could 
a mere reference. 
in Plynn v. Plynn (1954), 42 
P.2d 865], and my dissenting opinion 
m (1956), 46 Cal.2d 619, 637 [297 
P.2d 988] .) 
In addition to Justiee Carter's discussion it may be pointed 
out that the provisions of the doeument entitled "Property 
Settlement Agreement," whether considered alone or together 
with the allegations of plaintiff's complaint for divorce and 
the terms of the interlocutory and final decrees of divorce, 
appear to preclude the construction placed upon the agree-
ment by the trial court and the majority of this court. Rather, 
in my view, the agreement, the complaint for divorce, the 
divorce decrees, and the conduct of plaintiff and her former 
husband combine to demonstrate that the monthly payments 
were intended to be for alimony to the wife and support of 
the child, and the contrary determination of the trial court 
herein as to the alimony payments is untenable. 
The complaint for divorce alleged ''That there is no com-
munity prope1·ty the result of said marriage of the parties 
hereto, a JJroperty settlement agreement hav-ing been entered 
into ... That pla~·ntiff does not have sufficient money, means 
or property with which to st<pport and maintain herself and 
the minor child of the parties hereto, and that ... $60.00 
per month is a reasonable and necessary sum . . . for the 
support and maintenance of said plaintiff and said minor 
child." (Italics added.) The complaint prayed for "$60.00, 
per month, for the sttppm·t and maintenance of plaintiff and 
said minor child." (Italics added.) This is far from being 
a prayer for an order directing specific performance of a 
property settlement agreement, and following such prayer, the 
interlocutory decree ordered the husband to pay $60 a month 
''for the snpport and maintenance of said plaintiff and the 
minor child,'' not as specific performance of a property settle-
ment agreement. (Italics added.) 
The above quoted allegations of the complaint for divorce 
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are m accord with 
the 16) that"Subject 
to the approval by any Court of competent jurisdiction, 
Husband agrees to pay to Wife ... [$60] per month as and 
for the suppod and maintenance of \Vife and the minor 
child.'' (Italics added.) The general of para-
1, 5, and quoted in the majority opinion 278, 
do not overcome the specific of paragraph 
as to support. 
Plaintiff's in the divorce action that "there is no 
community property . ., a property settlement agreement 
been entered into,'' and that ''plaintiff does not have 
snffieient money, means or property with which to support 
... herself ... , '' are highly persuasive that what plaintiff 
for herself in the divorce action vms alimony, as such, 
not specific enforcement of a property settlement agreement, 
to which no issue was raised. If plaintiff were in fact 
seeking a decree ordering performance of a property settle-
ment agreement she could and should have sought its approval 
and a decree literally incorporating it in the judgment and 
ordering defendant to perform its covenants. 
The conduct of plaintiff in praying in the divorce action 
for support for herself and the child is consistent only with 
the view that the payments provided by paragraph 16 of the 
agreement were, as to plaintiff, for support, that is, alimony. 
Furthermore, plaintiff's subsequent eonduct in "stipulating" 
to and accepting a reduction in the amount of the payments, 
although the agreement contained no provision particularly 
dlrected to a change of such amount, indicates that plaintiff 
as well as the former husband considered and treated the 
payments as alimony and support, subject to court order 
and not as a part of the division of property. 
In these circumstances the rule quoted in the majority 
opinion (p. 279) from Messenger v. 11Iessenge1· (1956), su~pra., 
46 Cal.2d 619, 628, can have no application. Plaintiff 
did not treat the support provision of the agreement 
here as an "integral and inseparable part" of the property 
settlement portions of the agreement; she treated it, her 
former husband treated it, and in accord with their position 
the trial court in the divorce proceeding treated it, as an 
agreement for support and alimony in addition to, not as an 
integral part of, the settlement of their property rights. 
From the foregoing conclusion that the payments decreed 
47 C.2d-10 
01<' SKINKER C.2d 
to make such terminated with the death 
of the former husband insofar as such payments are alimony 
"''""'"'){"'' Court (1937 , 9 Cal.2d 733, 737 [72 P.2d 
Parker , 198 Cal. 478, 481 [225 P. 
Hamilton (1949), 94 Cal.App.2d 293, 
; Roberts v. Higgins , 122 Cal.App. 
) , although the obligation survives 
insofar as the payments are child 
( 1949), 34 Cal.2d 552, 556 [212 
; Newman v. Burwell , 216 Cal. 608, 612 
I ·would reverse the judgment with directions consistent 
with the views. 
Shenk, concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
1956. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, ,T., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
A. No. 24036. In Bank. Nov. 20, 1956.] 
Estate of ISABELLA N. SKINKEH, Deceased. NANCY 
SKINKEit WEDDLE, as Executrix et al., Appellants, 
v. HOBERT C. KIRKWOOD, as State Controller, Re-
spondent. 
[la, lb] Taxation-Inheritance Taxation-Deductions.-The com-
missions of an executrix and her attorney allowed as deduc-
tions for inheritance tax purposes should be the amount of 
statutory commissions in effect at the time of decedent's death, 
and not the increased fees as allowed by Prob. Code, § 901, 
as amended and effective at a later date. 
Deduction of commissions of executors, administrators or 
trustees in computing succession or estate tax, note, 92 A.L.R. 537. 
See also Cal.Jur., Taxation,§ 423; Am.Jur., Inheritance, Estate and 
Gift § 249 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: 2, 4-6] Taxation,§ 441(3); [3] Taxa-
tion, § 441(4); [7] Taxation, § 436; [8, 9] Taxation, § 437; [10] 
Statutes, § 161; [11] Decedents' Estates, §§ 219, 225; [12] De-
cedents' Estates, § 219. 
